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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OCON, PFOR

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE

1. FOLLOWING IS A NON-VERBATIM SUMMARY OF THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON OUR EUROPEAN POLICY AS OUTLINED TO THE EUR CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING IN LONDON IN MID-DECEMBER. IT COVERS DETENTE AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEMS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNISM. IT IS INTENDED FOR YOUR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE AND THAT OF YOUR SENIOR STAFF AND IS NOT TO BE USED DIRECTLY IN YOUR TALKS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE PROBLEM OF OUR AGE IS HOW TO MANAGE THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A SUPER-POWER. IN TODAY'S CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER SIDE CAN GAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THAT CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO POLITICAL UTILITY. A PERCEIVED STRATEGIC GAP WOULD HAVE ONLY MARGINAL POLITICAL BENEFIT. HOWEVER, THE PREDICTION THAT MANY MADE IN THE MID-FIFTIES, AND THAT WAS WRONG THEN, IS TRUE NOW -- THAT

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THE STRATEGIC BALANCE PROVIDES INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL PRESSURE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OUR TASK IS TO FIND WAYS TO RESTRAIN SOVIET POWER OVER AN HISTORICAL PERIOD. WE NEED A FOREIGN POLICY THAT WE

CAN SUSTAIN OVER TIME, NOT ONE GEARED TO OSCILLATIONS AND CYCLES OF CRISES.

3. IF STRATEGIC FORCES ARE TODAY LESS IMPORTANT, REGIONAL BALANCES GAIN MORE SIGNIFICANCE. WITHOUT A U.S. CONSENSUS, IT WILL BE HARD TO CONTAIN SOVIET POWER. WE NEED A PERMANENT CONCEPTION OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS -- A CONCEPTION THAT IS NOT BASED UPON PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERS, NOR ON EXPECTATIONS DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS PERIODS, NOR ON THE IDEA THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD HAVE PERMANENT CHANGES IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLICIES.

4. WE MUST BALANCE OFF SOVIET POWER AROUND THE WORLD THROUGH A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC MEANS. IN THE FAR EAST, THE PRC MUST BE A PART OF OUR POLITICAL CALCULATIONS.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE MUST NOT SEPARATE OURSELVES FROM THE DOMINANT POLITICAL CURRENTS. WE MUST PURSUE THERE A POLICY RELEVANT TO REGIONAL BALANCE.

5. THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC MUST SEE ITS GOVERNMENT AS BEING INTERESTED IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. TRUCULENCE TOWARD THE SOVIETS, WITH EVERYONE BEATING HIS CHEST, WOULD CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH OPINION LEADERS AND YOUTH WOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NEEDLESSLY JEOPARDIZING PEACE. THIS WOULD START THE KIND OF DEBATE THAT PARALYZED US IN THE VIETNAM WAR. WE NEED A UNITED STATES POLICY WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE EVEN FOR THOSE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES WHICH ARE ANTI-NATO TO DESCRIBE THE UNITED STATES CONNECTION AS A THREAT TO PEACE. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION, AS DURING THE UN SPECIAL SESSION WITH REGARD TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

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6. WE MUST CONTAIN THE SOVIETS AND PREVENT THEIR EXPANSION EITHER THROUGH WESTERN WEAKNESS OR THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE. TO DO THIS WE MUST ACHIEVE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR A LONG-TERM CONCEPTION OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. WE MUST DRAW THE SOVIET UNION INTO RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ARE BOTH CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL AND WE MUST CREATE THE MAXIMUM INCENTIVES FOR A MODERATE SOVIET COURSE. THE SOVIET SYSTEM HAS NOT CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY. IT IS AN AMALGAM OF AN IDEOLOGY THAT CANNOT RESIST MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA AND A BUREAUCRACY THAT MIXES CAUTION WITH PERSISTENCE. BUT THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO IMPERATIVES, FOR EXAMPLE A BAD ECONOMIC SITUATION, A FAILURE TO WIN IDEOLOGICAL ADHERENTS, AND PRESSURE FROM THE EAST. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, FOR THE WEST TO ENGAGE IN FRATRICIDAL CONFLICT WOULD BE FOLLY.

7. A GREAT DEAL OF WHAT HAS GONE WRONG IS NOT THE RESULT OF DETENTE OR OF SOVIET POLICY. EXAMPLES ARE PORTUGAL AND ITALY. THE PROBLEMS OF GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS ARE IN PART A RESULT OF DOMESTIC PARALYSIS IN THE U.S. EVEN ANGOLA REPRESENTS AS MUCH A JUDGMENT BY THE SOVIETS OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THE U.S. -- AS MUCH A REACTION TO OUR INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS -- AS IT DOES A LONG-TERM POLICY.

8. OUR DISCOMFORT IS AT HAVING TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY BY RELATIVE MEANS RATHER THAN BY UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS. THE FACT IS THAT, WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EMERGING SUPER POWER, WE ARE DOOMED TO COEXISTENCE. THUS TO SUM UP, DETENTE IS NOT AN AMELIORATION OF TONE. DETENTE IS THE IMPROVEMENT OF LONG-TERM RELATIONS WITH AN EMERGING SUPER POWER. AND THAT IS A PROBLEM WHICH WILL CONFRONT ANY AMERICAN PRESIDENT NO MATTER WHO HE IS.

9. WESTERN EUROPE CONTINUES TO BE THE BACKBONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE ARE DOING EXTREMELY WELL. BOTH THE FREQUENCY AND CONTENT OF OUR MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS ARE IMPROVING. THERE IS PRESENTLY A GREATER DEGREE OF REAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THAN THERE HAS BEEN DURING THE PAST DECADE AND A HALF. THE PERIOD IN WHICH EUROPE WAS

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ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE ITSELF IS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY OVER. WE ARE NOW CLOSER TO THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP THAT WE ENVISAGED WITH THE YEAR OF EUROPE IN 1973. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, THE WORLD HAS BECOME EVEN MORE INTERDEPENDENT AND THERE ARE NOW NEW PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE ATLANTIC CONTEXT. THIS INTERDEPENDENCE IS THE DOMINANT FACT OF OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. WE HAVE NOT YET ACHIEVED THE DEGREE OF COHERENCE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES THAT IS REQUIRED IN CRISIS SITUATIONS, BUT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS.

10. WHAT IS MOST WORRISOME IS NOT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, BUT THEIR DOMESTIC EVOLUTION. THE GROWTH OF LEFT-WING POLICIES THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS AND DEFENSE POLICIES ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED. AND THIS GROWTH IS BOUND TO AFFECT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. IN ITALY, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL AND MAYBE EVEN FRANCE, WE ARE WITNESSING THE RISING INFLUENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND WE ARE FACING THE QUESTION OF

WHAT WE SHOULD DO. THE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO RESOLVE A PARADOX. WE ARE ACCUSED OF BEING SOFT ON COMMUNISM AND HARD ON COMMUNIST PARTIES. WE ARE ASKED TO BE TOUGH WITH MOSCOW BUT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WEST.

11. ONE THING IS CLEAR, HOWEVER. THE DOMINANCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WEST IS UNACCEPTABLE. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE REASONABLENESS OF THESE PARTIES OR WITH THE DEGREE OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE WITH RUSSIA. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT, IF ONE OR THE OTHER OF THESE PARTIES TAKES CONTROL OF A WESTERN GOVERNMENT, IT WILL PERMIT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO OPERATE AND THEREBY FACE THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT MAY ITSELF BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE. A COMMUNIST PARTY TAKING CONTROL OF A GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND ITSELF ON A SPECIFIC POINT IN ITS LINE OF DEVELOPMENT, REGARDLESS OF WHAT IT MAY CLAIM, IT IS UNLIKELY TO TURN BACK THE CLOCK. MORE LIKELY, ONCE IT IS IN POWER IT WILL SEEK TO CHANGE THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF SOCIETY SO THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS CAN NO LONGER OPERATE. WE MUST DO

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OUR UTMOST TO ASSURE THE SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND TO PRESERVE THE WESTERN POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

12. SECONDLY, WE CAN HAVE FRUITFUL RELATIONS WITH TITOIST YUGOSLAVIA; WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH THAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT. BUT IT IS ANOTHER THING TO SAY THAT WE COULD HAVE A TITOIST ITALY IN NATO WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE OR IN THE US PERCEPTION OF NATO. IRRESPECTIVE OF OTHER FACTORS, THE PRIMARY APPEAL OF COMMUNISTS TO THE ELECTORATE HAS TO DO WITH THEIR POSITION ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT BOTHER THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY. SECURITY ISSUES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE LOW ON THEIR PRIORITY LIST IF THEY CAME TO POWER. THIS WOULD HAVE EFFECTS ON THE BALANCE OF EUROPEAN POWER AND WOULD IN TURN CAUSE A REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES. WE CANNOT ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES WITHIN NATO NATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND THEM AND THEIR AIMS, AND WE DOUBT THEY CAN BE MODERATED BY THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES. IF COMMUNISTS GET INTO POWER THEY WILL DEAL WITH US ON THE BASIS OF THEIR NECESSITIES AT THE TIME.

13. IT IS NOT OUR JOB TO MANIPULATE DOMESTIC POLITICS. OUR CAPACITY IS FINITE. BUT IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD MAINTAIN GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE IF THERE IS MAJOR COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THE FOUNDATION OF OUR ATLANTIC SECURITY WOULD THEREFORE BE ERODED.

14. THERE ARE THOSE WHO THINK WE ARE TOO INTRANSIGENT IN OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THESE WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. BUT WE CANNOT ENCOURAGE THE PROGRESS OF THESE PARTIES, NOR PERMIT THE SETTING OF A PRECEDENT IN WHICH BY OUR OWN INACTION WE HAVE FACILITATED THE SUCCESS OF A COMMUNIST PARTY. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH A PARTY FOLLOWS THE MOSCOW LINE IS UNIMPORTANT. EVEN IF PORTUGAL HAD FOLLOWED THE ITALIAN MODEL, WE WOULD STILL HAVE BEEN OPPOSED. IT IS NOT JUST BECAUSE CUNHAL IS A STALINIST THAT WE ARE IN OPPOSITION. EVEN THE IMPACT OF AN ITALIAN

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COMMUNIST PARTY THAT SEEMED TO BE GOVERNING EFFECTIVELY WOULD BE DEVASTATING -- ON FRANCE, AND ON NATO TOO.

15. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE COULD CONTINUE TO HAVE NATO DISCUSSIONS IF THESE VARIOUS COMMUNIST PARTIES DID ACHIEVE CONTROL OF WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. WE COULD, AS WITH CHINA, PERHAPS HAVE PARALLEL POLICIES, BUT THE ALLIANCE AS IT IS NOW COULD NOT SURVIVE. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAS ALWAYS HAD AN IMPORTANCE BEYOND MILITARY SECURITY. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ALONE AND ISOLATED IN A WORLD IN WHICH WE HAD NO RELATIONS BY VALUES TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

16. AS FOR SOCIALISTS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM. WE DO SO IN PORTUGAL. WE MUST DO SO IN ITALY, ALTHOUGH THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY WILL BE UNRELIABLE UNTIL THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS CAN ORGANIZE THEMSELVES. WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SPD IN GERMANY. IN SPAIN THERE MUST BE AN EVOLUTION TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND BETTER INSTITUTIONS WITHOUT ERODING THE STRENGTHS OF THE COUNTRY AND PRODUCING ANOTHER PORTUGAL. POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN SPAIN WILL MEAN BLOODSHED AND THE SPANISH, AT LEAST HISTORICALLY, ARE NOT USED TO RESOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEABLY.

17. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT THE KEY ELEMENT THAT IS PRODUCING THE PRESENT INSTABILITIES THAT WE NOW FACE IN WESTERN EUROPE. A COMMUNIST WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE A HEADACHE FOR US. IT WOULD BE A HEADACHE FOR THE SOVIETS AS WELL. THEY PROBABLY PREFER NOT TO SEE COMMUNIST POWERS TAKING OVER IN WESTERN EUROPE. BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THEIR IDEOLOGY REQUIRES THEM TO ASSIST IN THESE EFFORTS. THE USSR HAS PROBABLY NOT BEEN A DECISIVE ELEMENT IN PORTUGAL, BUT WE CANNOT REASONABLY EXPECT IT TO DO NOTHING.

18. IF COMMUNIST PARTIES TAKE POWER IN SEVERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES, THERE WOULD BE A SHOCKING CHANGE IN THE ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF AMERICAN POLICY. IT COULD RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE

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AN ISLAND IN ITS OWN VALUES, AND THEREBY BE FORCED TO MANIPULATE VARIOUS COMMUNIST CENTERS OF POWER AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE UNITED STATES COULD PROBABLY SURVIVE THIS SITUATION, BUT ONLY THROUGH THE USE OF A RUTHLESS BALANCE OF POWER POLICY. IF WE WERE TO HAVE TO DO THIS, WE WOULD HAVE LOST THE MORAL FOUNDATION WE HAVE OPERATED ON FOR OUR ENTIRE HISTORY.

19. THERE IS AN INCONSISTENCY PERCEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN OUR OPPOSING COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND OUR TALKING TO THEM IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE MUST OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC'S MIND.
END SUMMARY.

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